http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-cubaecon20feb20,1,7782700.story?track=rss
From the Los Angeles Times
FIDEL CASTRO STEPS DOWN: U.S. businesses are eager to jump in
For many, the question is when, not if, trade barriers against Cuba will be lifted, a veteran observer says.
By Marla Dickerson
Los Angeles Times Staff WriterFebruary 20, 2008
MEXICO CITY — With Fidel Castro stepping aside, California vegetable growers, Alabama chicken producers and Kansas wheat farmers -- not to mention scores of other nonagricultural businesses -- see new opportunity to push for an expansion of U.S.-Cuba trade.
America has quietly become the largest foreign supplier of food products to the communist nation, thanks to a loosening of the long-standing U.S. trade embargo against the island nation in 2000. U.S. farmers sold an estimated $437 million worth of agricultural products to Cuba last year, according to the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. The Cuban government puts the figure even higher, at more than $600 million.
Though the U.S. has limited its trade to mostly agricultural items, economic rivals such as China have been much more aggressive -- cutting deals with Cuba to develop its oil reserves and other natural resources. With a population of more than 11 million just 90 miles off the U.S. coast, Cuba is a largely untapped market for American goods and services.
"We're leaving billions of dollars on the table," said Kirby Jones, president of Alamar Associates, a Maryland-based consulting firm that advises companies interested in doing business in Cuba. "By any measure, [U.S. policy] has been a failure."
U.S. officials said Tuesday that there were no immediate plans for further easing of the 46-year-old trade embargo. Experts said American policymakers would proceed cautiously given that Castro is still alive, and given that Florida, with its powerful anti-Castro lobby of Cuban Americans, may play a decisive role in the U.S. presidential election.
Still, some veteran observers said that Castro's departure marks another small but inevitable step toward closer trade ties with Cuba, particularly at a time when globalization is forcing the U.S. to fight for market share in every corner of the globe.
"Most [American] businesspeople are thinking in terms of 'when' instead of 'if' " the embargo is lifted, said Mario Sacasa, senior vice president for international programs with the Beacon Council, a Miami-based economic development organization. "Their question is always: 'Why does the U.S. trade with other non-democratic governments but not with Cuba?' "
For nearly half a century, the trade embargo has been an unassailable feature of U.S. foreign policy, strongly supported by South Florida's conservative Cuban American community. Thousands of people lost their homes, businesses and other private property to Castro's communist regime, a bitter memory that has shaped U.S. policy ever since.
But another powerful U.S. lobby -- farmers -- has managed to crack that blockade ever so slightly.
Under pressure from agriculture groups, Congress in late 2000 approved sales of commodities and food products to the island, as long as Cuba paid upfront in cash and the transactions weren't handled by U.S. banks.
Despite those tricky terms, trade took off almost immediately. By 2003, the United States had surpassed the European Union as Cuba's largest foreign supplier of agricultural products, according to the U.S. International Trade Commission.
Major exports include corn, chicken, wheat, soybeans and rice. A parade of U.S. representatives and trade delegations have traveled to Cuba in recent years to try to strike trade deals.
But California, America's largest farm state, sells virtually nothing to Cuba. Exports in 2006 totaled a paltry $735,000, mostly in tomatoes, almonds and table grapes, according to the latest figures available from the state.
Last month California sent a large agricultural delegation to Cuba in the hopes of cultivating stronger trade ties with the Caribbean nation. Golden State growers are looking for opportunities wherever they present themselves, said Ken Gilliland, director of international trade for the Western Growers Assn.
He said critics' contention that California farmers would be propping up a communist regime by selling fruit and vegetables to Cuba just doesn't ring true with the state's producers.
"We're not talking about some sensitive technology or computers or arms or anything like that. We're talking about food," Gilliland said. "Practically the whole world is already trading with Cuba." U.S. policy "just kind of puts us growers and producers at a disadvantage."
Countries such as China and Canada are exploring for petroleum in Cuban waters and helping the country develop its nickel reserves. Spanish companies have invested heavily in Cuba's tourism sector, and Brazil is looking to build roads and other infrastructure. India wants to cooperate with Cuba in science and high technology.
Some U.S. firms complain that the Cuban government has pressed them to lobby their legislators for an end to the American trade embargo in exchange for contracts -- a price some have found too steep, according to John Kavulich, a senior policy advisor with the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council.
"The problem is when the Cubans start putting conditions" on the contracts, said Kavulich, who declined to name companies that have been pressured in such a way.
Kavulich said that so far, U.S. businesspeople have shown little excitement about the changing of the guard in Cuba. "They know that nothing has changed," he said.
Still, consultant Jones said that the real shift that American businesses are waiting for will come out of Washington, not Havana, with the U.S. elections in November.
He said the departure of Castro, an impossibly polarizing figure, combined with new leadership in the White House could lead initially to small changes such as liberalizing U.S. travel restrictions to Cuba -- and perhaps bigger ones down the road.
"It's a recipe for rethinking and change," he said.
Showing posts with label new policies. Show all posts
Showing posts with label new policies. Show all posts
Thursday, February 28, 2008
Monday, February 4, 2008
Sudden EU Commission Change of Heart on CO2 Rules Against Industry???? It's the Economy Stupid!!
http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/46516/story.htm
EU to Set Easier CO2 Regime for Heavy Industries
Paul Taylor
Planet Ark
January 21, 2008
BRUSSELS - Europe's steel, aluminium and cement industries will have a special, less strict regime for greenhouse gas emissions under European Commission proposals to fight climate change to be announced this week.
After weeks of intense lobbying by business and governments, EU sources said on Sunday those three energy-intensive industries would be introduced more slowly into a new system for auctioning permits to emit carbon dioxide (CO2) from 2013.
The sources insisted on anonymity because wrangling is continuing in the Commission on final details of the proposals on CO2 emissions, renewable energy sources, biofuels and carbon sequestration to be unveiled on Wednesday.
A key flaw of the EU's Emissions Trading Scheme -- the main instrument for curbing pollution blamed for global warming -- has been that governments issued emission permits for free, handing industry windfall profits.
Under a planned reform, the sources said most sectors covered by the ETS will have to buy about one-fifth of emission permits from 2013 -- fewer than in early drafts of the proposal -- rising annually to reach 100 percent in 2020.
Those sectors include energy and power generation, including refineries, despite fierce lobbying by European oil majors BP and Shell to go easy on refineries.
The overall aim is to reduce European emissions of CO2 by at least 20 percent by 2020 compared to 1990 levels.
[MY, MY: HOW EU ASPIRATIONS FOR ENLIGHTENED ENVIRONMENTALISM HAVE FALLEN!!]
However, the sources said the EU executive was sensitive to concerns that the three big energy-intensive industries could be driven out of Europe if subjected to the same regime.
[EU COMMISSION SMELLS THE COFFEE!!]
"Those concerns are being sufficiently taken into account through the benchmarking regime and a different allocation regime," one official said.
WHITTLED DOWN
He declined to give figures but said energy-intensive industries would have a bigger initial allocation than originally planned, a lower starting point for the percentage of emissions permits to be auctioned and a slower phase-in.
The Carbon Trust, a British government-funded body charged with helping companies cut emissions, warned earlier this month that cement, steel, aluminium, chemicals, fertiliser and pulp and paper businesses might be hurt by the stricter EU regime.
But the sources said officials had whittled down the number of energy-intensive sectors likely to enjoy special treatment to just the three.
Europe's top business lobby last week attacked Commission plans to implement the deep emissions cuts agreed by EU leaders last year, saying that auctioning pollution permits could hurt industry in global competition.
"In the absence of a comprehensive international agreement, auctioning of allowances will harm the competitiveness of European companies, especially in energy-intensive industries," BusinessEurope Secretary-General Philippe de Buck wrote in a letter to Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso.
The draft proposal provides for a review in 2011 of the impact on energy-intensive industries, depending on whether there has been an international pact on curbing emissions by then.
The EU package will also propose mandatory national targets for cutting CO2 emissions from buildings, heating and cooling and transport, as well as binding national targets for using renewable energy sources in power generation. (Editing by Caroline Drees)
EU to Set Easier CO2 Regime for Heavy Industries
Paul Taylor
Planet Ark
January 21, 2008
BRUSSELS - Europe's steel, aluminium and cement industries will have a special, less strict regime for greenhouse gas emissions under European Commission proposals to fight climate change to be announced this week.
After weeks of intense lobbying by business and governments, EU sources said on Sunday those three energy-intensive industries would be introduced more slowly into a new system for auctioning permits to emit carbon dioxide (CO2) from 2013.
The sources insisted on anonymity because wrangling is continuing in the Commission on final details of the proposals on CO2 emissions, renewable energy sources, biofuels and carbon sequestration to be unveiled on Wednesday.
A key flaw of the EU's Emissions Trading Scheme -- the main instrument for curbing pollution blamed for global warming -- has been that governments issued emission permits for free, handing industry windfall profits.
Under a planned reform, the sources said most sectors covered by the ETS will have to buy about one-fifth of emission permits from 2013 -- fewer than in early drafts of the proposal -- rising annually to reach 100 percent in 2020.
Those sectors include energy and power generation, including refineries, despite fierce lobbying by European oil majors BP and Shell to go easy on refineries.
The overall aim is to reduce European emissions of CO2 by at least 20 percent by 2020 compared to 1990 levels.
[MY, MY: HOW EU ASPIRATIONS FOR ENLIGHTENED ENVIRONMENTALISM HAVE FALLEN!!]
However, the sources said the EU executive was sensitive to concerns that the three big energy-intensive industries could be driven out of Europe if subjected to the same regime.
[EU COMMISSION SMELLS THE COFFEE!!]
"Those concerns are being sufficiently taken into account through the benchmarking regime and a different allocation regime," one official said.
WHITTLED DOWN
He declined to give figures but said energy-intensive industries would have a bigger initial allocation than originally planned, a lower starting point for the percentage of emissions permits to be auctioned and a slower phase-in.
The Carbon Trust, a British government-funded body charged with helping companies cut emissions, warned earlier this month that cement, steel, aluminium, chemicals, fertiliser and pulp and paper businesses might be hurt by the stricter EU regime.
But the sources said officials had whittled down the number of energy-intensive sectors likely to enjoy special treatment to just the three.
Europe's top business lobby last week attacked Commission plans to implement the deep emissions cuts agreed by EU leaders last year, saying that auctioning pollution permits could hurt industry in global competition.
"In the absence of a comprehensive international agreement, auctioning of allowances will harm the competitiveness of European companies, especially in energy-intensive industries," BusinessEurope Secretary-General Philippe de Buck wrote in a letter to Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso.
The draft proposal provides for a review in 2011 of the impact on energy-intensive industries, depending on whether there has been an international pact on curbing emissions by then.
The EU package will also propose mandatory national targets for cutting CO2 emissions from buildings, heating and cooling and transport, as well as binding national targets for using renewable energy sources in power generation. (Editing by Caroline Drees)
2008: Trade Barriers or Trade Liberalization??
2008: Trade Barriers or Trade Liberalization??
Trade Disputes Will Mark 2008
http://www.forbes.com/opinions/2008/01/28/doha-trade-talks-oped-cx_ccp_0129doha.html
FORBES
C. Christopher Parlin
January 28, 2008
Washington, D.C. -
The trade policy outlook for this year is grim, though a concerted effort and a change in approach by many businesspeople could stem backsliding into protectionism.
In the U.S., worsening economic news coupled with the upcoming elections guarantee slow, if any, progress in reducing worldwide trade barriers and increasing market access for U.S. companies. Around the world, these negatives are reinforced by fear of ever-expanding Chinese exports, lack of political will in the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Doha negotiators, and reluctance by trading partners to make concessions to the U.S. in the absence of the president's fast track negotiating authority (aka trade promotion authority).
There will be tensions this year because of the economic and political climate and the lack of breakthroughs in the Doha negotiations. There will be disagreements regarding actions taken (and not taken) as a result of this tension. The question is how these disagreements will be managed and whether they will lead to trade disputes.
The default option is a significant increase in disputes, as the focus of the U.S. and its trading partners leads to protectionist and discriminatory policies. Most will lose in the long run if this happens. The challenge now is to analyze the difficulties that the multilateral trading system will face and develop strategies to limit the resulting harm and serve as stepping stones for resumed progress when the worldwide economic and political climate improves.
Historically, trade liberalization efforts have succeeded only in a healthy worldwide economic climate (the Uruguay Round negotiations creating the WTO in the early 1990s) or after an economic cataclysm (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT, after World War II). At such times, governments and businesses focus on the horse trading necessary to achieve greater worldwide liberalization. The concept of giving in order to get--of reducing some of your trade barriers to secure reductions from others in areas of greater interest to you--is recognized and acted on. Those losing protection don't like it, but the pro-liberalization forces are stronger.
By contrast, in problematic economic climates, fear of giving predominates. Politicians hear more from constituents condemning adverse effects of imports (and now globalization) on income and jobs than they do from those seeking to give or receive expanded market access. In the U.S., this shift was apparent in the 2006 congressional elections. And it becomes more evident every day as signs of an economic slowdown grow. Bipartisan efforts to enact a stimulus package are welcome, but they are extremely unlikely to improve the trade policy picture.
At the same time, the prospects for a pro-trade congressional majority are nil, and, although much of the protectionist rhetoric of U.S. presidential candidates is just talk, the prospects for a trade-friendly administration are uncertain, at best. The systemic concern caused by a weakening economy is bolstered by particularized fear of a continued Chinese economic juggernaut. No amount of learned discourse, or administration exhortation about the economic benefits of further trade liberalization for the country as a whole, can counteract the present fearful mood in the U.S.
Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. has been described as the locomotive of world trade liberalization. A very solid argument can be made that GATT was created and the WTO evolved from it as a result of U.S. willingness to make the market-opening concessions necessary to drive other countries to agree to ever greater reductions of trade barriers and increases in market access opportunities.
Despite valiant efforts by the U.S. trade representative, Susan C. Schwab, the country now is stopped on a siding. The public does not accept pro-trade rhetoric, and the administration is unable to credibly promise trading partners that Congress will enact trade-liberalizing measures such as reducing agricultural support (enhancing the competitiveness of other agricultural exporters) or changing certain U.S. anti-dumping rules that most of our trading partners view as blatantly protectionist.
A replacement locomotive is needed, but none has appeared. Neither the European Union, Japan nor any collection of countries has stepped forward to provide leadership in the WTO's Doha negotiations. Instead, the goal seems to be to ensure that blame for failure is attributed to someone else. This is intensified by the inability of the administration to secure renewal of trade promotion authority (under which Congress agrees to an up or down vote on trade agreements, ceding its normal ability to condition ratification on amendments to the negotiated text). Not surprisingly, many of our trading partners will use the absence of fast track as an excuse for not making concessions sought by the U.S., asserting that Congress would demand additional concessions beyond those ultimately negotiated by the administration.
What is to be done? One possibility is to hunker down and wait for better times. That would ensure at best a standstill, but more likely a worldwide increase in protectionism throughout 2008. There is a better option, though. This could be a bad year for forward-looking trade policy, but it need not be a disaster. Rather than ceding the field to those advocating policies of increased protection and unilateralism, the proponents of multilateral liberalization could seek to preserve the positive aspects of the Doha negotiations. Even though significant breakthroughs leading to a successful conclusion will not occur in 2008, the negotiations need not collapse.
Experience during the Uruguay Round is instructive. There was a three-year period when none of the major negotiating parties was able to move on politically sensitive issues such as agriculture, services and textiles. Despite this high-level paralysis, all of the 15 subject matter negotiating groups continued to plug away. As a result, when worldwide political will re-emerged in mid-1993, most of the technical underbrush had been cleared away. A similar scenario could occur this year. The negotiating gains achieved to date could be preserved and steps taken to make technical progress where possible.
On the domestic front, too, 2008 need not be a disaster. Here, the keys will be education and understanding.
To avoid significant backsliding, those supporting multilateral liberalization must emerge from their foxholes and engage more actively and effectively in the globalization debate, educating politicians and opinion makers about the benefits of additional liberalization. At the same time, they must not ignore the dark side of globalization: It has not benefited all Americans. Many have legitimate concerns about their income and jobs.
Economics 101 lectures about the overall benefits of free trade may be sound economically, but will not be politically successful, especially given the worsening economic climate. To strengthen their presentation, advocates of trade liberalization must work to reformulate, advocate and implement policies that will assist those whose lives are negatively affected by globalization. The choice is theoretical purity and political defeat, or creative solutions that recognize the political climate.
Effectively, the course of trade policy today is dependent on what is done by those supporting increased trade liberalization. If they do nothing, the year will see significantly increased international economic tensions, disagreements and disputes. The challenge is to develop a new model in support of liberalization, one that accepts reality and proposes solutions for those who are harmed by globalization. By doing so, we may limit protectionist backsliding so progress can resume when the worldwide economic and political climate improves.
Trade Disputes Will Mark 2008
http://www.forbes.com/opinions/2008/01/28/doha-trade-talks-oped-cx_ccp_0129doha.html
FORBES
C. Christopher Parlin
January 28, 2008
Washington, D.C. -
The trade policy outlook for this year is grim, though a concerted effort and a change in approach by many businesspeople could stem backsliding into protectionism.
In the U.S., worsening economic news coupled with the upcoming elections guarantee slow, if any, progress in reducing worldwide trade barriers and increasing market access for U.S. companies. Around the world, these negatives are reinforced by fear of ever-expanding Chinese exports, lack of political will in the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Doha negotiators, and reluctance by trading partners to make concessions to the U.S. in the absence of the president's fast track negotiating authority (aka trade promotion authority).
There will be tensions this year because of the economic and political climate and the lack of breakthroughs in the Doha negotiations. There will be disagreements regarding actions taken (and not taken) as a result of this tension. The question is how these disagreements will be managed and whether they will lead to trade disputes.
The default option is a significant increase in disputes, as the focus of the U.S. and its trading partners leads to protectionist and discriminatory policies. Most will lose in the long run if this happens. The challenge now is to analyze the difficulties that the multilateral trading system will face and develop strategies to limit the resulting harm and serve as stepping stones for resumed progress when the worldwide economic and political climate improves.
Historically, trade liberalization efforts have succeeded only in a healthy worldwide economic climate (the Uruguay Round negotiations creating the WTO in the early 1990s) or after an economic cataclysm (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT, after World War II). At such times, governments and businesses focus on the horse trading necessary to achieve greater worldwide liberalization. The concept of giving in order to get--of reducing some of your trade barriers to secure reductions from others in areas of greater interest to you--is recognized and acted on. Those losing protection don't like it, but the pro-liberalization forces are stronger.
By contrast, in problematic economic climates, fear of giving predominates. Politicians hear more from constituents condemning adverse effects of imports (and now globalization) on income and jobs than they do from those seeking to give or receive expanded market access. In the U.S., this shift was apparent in the 2006 congressional elections. And it becomes more evident every day as signs of an economic slowdown grow. Bipartisan efforts to enact a stimulus package are welcome, but they are extremely unlikely to improve the trade policy picture.
At the same time, the prospects for a pro-trade congressional majority are nil, and, although much of the protectionist rhetoric of U.S. presidential candidates is just talk, the prospects for a trade-friendly administration are uncertain, at best. The systemic concern caused by a weakening economy is bolstered by particularized fear of a continued Chinese economic juggernaut. No amount of learned discourse, or administration exhortation about the economic benefits of further trade liberalization for the country as a whole, can counteract the present fearful mood in the U.S.
Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. has been described as the locomotive of world trade liberalization. A very solid argument can be made that GATT was created and the WTO evolved from it as a result of U.S. willingness to make the market-opening concessions necessary to drive other countries to agree to ever greater reductions of trade barriers and increases in market access opportunities.
Despite valiant efforts by the U.S. trade representative, Susan C. Schwab, the country now is stopped on a siding. The public does not accept pro-trade rhetoric, and the administration is unable to credibly promise trading partners that Congress will enact trade-liberalizing measures such as reducing agricultural support (enhancing the competitiveness of other agricultural exporters) or changing certain U.S. anti-dumping rules that most of our trading partners view as blatantly protectionist.
A replacement locomotive is needed, but none has appeared. Neither the European Union, Japan nor any collection of countries has stepped forward to provide leadership in the WTO's Doha negotiations. Instead, the goal seems to be to ensure that blame for failure is attributed to someone else. This is intensified by the inability of the administration to secure renewal of trade promotion authority (under which Congress agrees to an up or down vote on trade agreements, ceding its normal ability to condition ratification on amendments to the negotiated text). Not surprisingly, many of our trading partners will use the absence of fast track as an excuse for not making concessions sought by the U.S., asserting that Congress would demand additional concessions beyond those ultimately negotiated by the administration.
What is to be done? One possibility is to hunker down and wait for better times. That would ensure at best a standstill, but more likely a worldwide increase in protectionism throughout 2008. There is a better option, though. This could be a bad year for forward-looking trade policy, but it need not be a disaster. Rather than ceding the field to those advocating policies of increased protection and unilateralism, the proponents of multilateral liberalization could seek to preserve the positive aspects of the Doha negotiations. Even though significant breakthroughs leading to a successful conclusion will not occur in 2008, the negotiations need not collapse.
Experience during the Uruguay Round is instructive. There was a three-year period when none of the major negotiating parties was able to move on politically sensitive issues such as agriculture, services and textiles. Despite this high-level paralysis, all of the 15 subject matter negotiating groups continued to plug away. As a result, when worldwide political will re-emerged in mid-1993, most of the technical underbrush had been cleared away. A similar scenario could occur this year. The negotiating gains achieved to date could be preserved and steps taken to make technical progress where possible.
On the domestic front, too, 2008 need not be a disaster. Here, the keys will be education and understanding.
To avoid significant backsliding, those supporting multilateral liberalization must emerge from their foxholes and engage more actively and effectively in the globalization debate, educating politicians and opinion makers about the benefits of additional liberalization. At the same time, they must not ignore the dark side of globalization: It has not benefited all Americans. Many have legitimate concerns about their income and jobs.
Economics 101 lectures about the overall benefits of free trade may be sound economically, but will not be politically successful, especially given the worsening economic climate. To strengthen their presentation, advocates of trade liberalization must work to reformulate, advocate and implement policies that will assist those whose lives are negatively affected by globalization. The choice is theoretical purity and political defeat, or creative solutions that recognize the political climate.
Effectively, the course of trade policy today is dependent on what is done by those supporting increased trade liberalization. If they do nothing, the year will see significantly increased international economic tensions, disagreements and disputes. The challenge is to develop a new model in support of liberalization, one that accepts reality and proposes solutions for those who are harmed by globalization. By doing so, we may limit protectionist backsliding so progress can resume when the worldwide economic and political climate improves.
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