Showing posts with label nontariff barriers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label nontariff barriers. Show all posts

Monday, May 5, 2008

U.S. WTO Submission - 'Determining the Need to Regulate' - A Document Even the 110th Congress Can Learn From


http://www.wtocenter.org.tw/SmartKMS/fileviewer?id=93847


World Trade Organization


Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade


G/TBT/W/285 (March 19, 2008)


DETERMINING THE NEED TO REGULATE

Communication from the United States


I. INTRODUCTION


1. In its successive reviews of the World Trade Organization Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), the TBT Committee has highlighted the importance and relevance of “good regulatory practice” as a tool for preventing the creation of unnecessary obstacles to international trade. From the U.S. perspective, an important component of good regulatory practice is the effective use of processes and analytic tools for determining the need to regulate. These processes and tools rely significantly on the commonly accepted principles for good regulatory practice originally set forth in the 1995 OECD Recommendation on Improving the Quality of Government Regulation and discussed in an earlier communication from the United States to the TBT Committee on “Good Regulatory Practice.”[1]


2. Discussions of good regulatory practice address issues that go beyond the scope of the TBT Agreement; nevertheless, the principles are relevant to the development and application of standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessment procedures. The successful application of good regulatory practices should reinforce, in a domestic context, the goal of preventing unnecessary obstacles to international trade.


3. This U.S. submission responds to the Committee’s invitation for the submission of papers and provides an overview and summary of the key elements that are part of the U.S. federal regulatory approach for determining when it is necessary to regulate.
[1] G/TBT/W/258, 26 October 2005.


A. Background

B. Identification of the Need for a Regulation

C. Consideration of Legal Requirements

D. Consideration of Alternatives

E. Risk Assessments[11]

F. Cost-Benefit Analyses[14]

G. Continual Reassessment of Need During the Regulatory Process


H. The Logic of the Decision


1. During the preparation or review of a draft regulation, there are a number of questions that should be asked to ensure that the regulatory decision is justified. This process can be somewhat like a peer review, with questions being asked about the basis for assumptions or the source of data, about legal authority or policy judgments, etc. Many of these questions reflect the disciplines and principles of the WTO agreements, particularly the TBT Agreement.


The basic, general questions that should be addressed, with some possible follow-up questions, include:


(a) Is the problem or policy goal clear? For example, for a safety regulation, why do private markets provide less than the optimal amount of safety? Have the agency officials made the objective clear enough to ensure that it will be met by the regulatory action? Are they sure that a regulation is being issued to address a problem that really exists?


(b) Will the regulatory action address the problem? If the objective is to make bathrooms in a building accessible to disabled persons, for example, will the regulation require that the bathroom be accessible, but not that the building itself be accessible? If you require that drug or food labels include information for the consumer to ensure they do not use drugs or food that may be harmful, would tests show that the average person would not understand the label? If you require seats on aircraft that will withstand greater crash forces, will the aircraft floor be strong enough to hold the seat in place when subject to those forces?


(c) Do the data and the analyses support the decision? Are the costs and market distortions minimized while the benefits are maximized? Are data sources reliable? Are the ranges of possibilities so broad that the basis of the decision is questionable?


(d) Is the action sensible? Is it possible that a mistaken decision could cause serious harm to the marketplace or adversely affect health, safety, or the environment?


(e) Are the assumptions reasonably explained and supported? Are appropriate sensitivity analyses conducted to respond to challenges to assumptions?


(f) Does the regulation comply with legal requirements, including international agreements (including the WTO agreements, bilateral and regional free trade agreements, and mutual recognition agreements) to which the United States is a party, statutes (including implementing legislation for such agreements), executive orders, and regulations?


(g) Are conflicts or other effects on achieving other objectives and requirements explained and justified? Assuming, for example, that a regulation is necessary, in assessing alternatives has there been any consideration of how other governments have chosen to regulate in this particular area? Have there been any consultations with foreign governments?


(h) Could the regulatory action have unintended consequences? Could the increase in costs for a product or service as a result of a required safety improvement cause consumers to choose alternatives even less safe than the product or service before it was improved? Because of costs, would a company have to forego one safety protection in order to provide another required protection? For example, would consumers choose a less safe way to travel, if regulations raised the cost of another mode of transportation? Would patients refuse to take a necessary drug, because a required warning about a very minor risk associated with the medication scared them?


(i) Will the action promote or hinder innovation, competition, trade, and investment? If the regulation does not reference or incorporate performance standards, specifically internationally-developed standards, if available, why not? Does the regulation require the use of U.S. certification agencies or laboratories and, if so, why? Will foreign businesses have a hard time complying because the regulation is based on U.S. industry manufacturing processes?


(j) Are there reasonable alternatives and explanations for their rejection?


(k) Is the regulation clear, practical, and easily enforced? Would a regulatory alternative that is more acceptable to the regulated community but establishes a slightly lower level of protection end up providing more protection if regulated entities were more likely to comply with it? Or if it were easier for the industry to comply?


III. CONCLUSION


33. A thoughtful, open, and transparent process for examining the need for regulation leads to better decisions. Well-done analyses are exceptionally valuable tools in this decision-making process. They have convinced advocates of one position or another to change their minds about a particular action.


34. If the process is used correctly, there will be better participation in the process by the public and other governments, and regulations are much less likely to create trade barriers or other problems.


FOOTNOTES


[1] G/TBT/W/258, 26 October 2005.


[11] See f.n. 3, supra. See also, Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for FY 2000, Pub. L No. 106-554; § 515 (“Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information” and OMB “Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies” (2002). {[3] See “Updated Principles for Risk Analysis” (December 19, 2007 memorandum from the Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Associate Director and Deputy Director for Science, Office of Science and Technology Policy; OMB regulatory documents are generally available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ omb/inforeg/regpol.html).}


[14] See f.n. 4, supra. {[4] See OMB Circular No. A-4, “Regulatory Analysis” (2003).}

Monday, March 31, 2008

Eco-Fashion or Eco-Fashism: How Involved is the EU Commission in Promoting 'Market-Based' Eco-Labels as Disguised Trade Barriers?

http://www.europe.org.uk/index/-/id/137


Eco-fashion


Europe in the UK


As the Craft Council's exhibition 'Well Fashioned: Eco Style in the UK' begins its nationwide tour, Lucy Lethbridge tells us more about 'green' couture in Europe.











The very idea of environmentally-friendly fashion may seem a contradiction in terms. Clothes that are fairly traded, vegetable-dyed, animal-loving, free of pesticides, harmful chemicals and toxic bleach and made entirely by adults paid a living wage? You must be talking hemp jerkins or homespun cardigans dyed with woad - it's surely not haute couture, or even faintly trendy.


But think again. Fashion designers, boutiques and clothing companies all over Europe are the latest to ride the wave of ethical, environmental, sustainable, ecologically-aware products that currently account for a massive £24 billion of the UK market alone.


The success of eco-friendly designers like the Dutch firm Kuyichi demonstrates that there is increasing interest in where your clothing comes from as well as what it looks like. This business is about more than just shopping and fashion: Kuyichi advertises itself first and foremost by its ethical credentials: the company has been responsible for "5,000,000 metres of organic yarn"; 450 farmers growing our organic cotton in India; 15 per cent of our profits go to the people who help make Kuyichi".


Who wouldn't want to be part of such a beneficent world force - even if it meant paying a lot more for a t-shirt than in Primark or Matalan? The fact is that once you know that cotton growing is so heavy on the use of chemicals that 25 per cent of the world's pesticides are used on cotton alone - well, it rather puts you off that cheap T-shirt in bright, bright white. (Take a look at the Clean Clothes Campaign - ww.cleanclothes.org - supported by Oxfam and other European NGOs for some firsthand information on the truth behind the T-shirt - and don't think that if it was made in an eastern Europe sweatshop it makes it more ethical than one made in an Asian sweatshop.)


Environmental NGO Greenpeace are active campaigners in support of textiles that demonstrate an environmentally and socially responsible source. They have compiled a detailed directory, Natural Matters, (http://www.naturalmatters.net/) of organic cotton manufacturers and sustainable clothing producers. As one designer said to me, "You need to be on one of these green directories - it gives credibility".


There are jeans made with organic denim; recycled jumpers, saris and evening dresses; clothes and jewellery made in co-operatives that pay fair wages to women in developing countries; a booming industry in pesticide-free baby clothes; shoes made with vegetable-dyed leather from happy cows. What is more, they all look pretty good: sharp, cosmopolitan, fashionable - and not remotely like the smelly, saggy sackcloth of the hippyish past.


Eco-fashion is now attracting the interest of top designers as well as fashion graduates who are setting up businesses allied with organisations, banks and NGOs such as Solidaridad, the Dutch campaigners for organic and fairly-traded cotton, the Soil Association, the British campaign group for organic agriculture, and Triodos (http://www.triodos.com/), the Europe-wide bank, founded in the Netherlands, which lends only to enterprises concerned sustainable and ethical businesses, that makes "positive contributions to the environment and to social projects". James Niven of Triodos in Bristol says that the interest is growing: "Ethical fashion is not just an outside runner but a really good and robust business proposition".


The European Union itself has established an "EU Eco-label" in the shape of a flower logo which is awarded to companies that have been checked by independent experts who will vouch for their eco-credentials.

[ http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/index_en.htm -
http://www.eco-label.com/default.htm ]



[??? - THESE PEOPLE ARE HARDLY EXPERTS - RATHER THEY ARE SELF-APPOINTED ENVIRO-GURUS WITH DELEGATED GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT POWERS THAT IMPOSE THEIR PREFERENCES ON COMPANIES & CONSUMERS!!] who will vouch for their eco-credentials ???].


The Soil Association in Britain has an accredited list of organic textile suppliers including growers of hemp - perhaps the most environmentally friendly and under-used of crops. ["The Soil Association is the UK's leading campaigning and certification organisation for organic food and farming... The Soil Association symbol can be found on over 70% of Britain's organic produce - a guarantee that it has been grown or produced to the highest standards of organic integrity [??]. We also undertake certification of timber and wood products. Soil Association Certification Ltd enforces these standards through certification and regular inspections of producers, processors and suppliers."


The imagination and ingenuity of these emerging designers is inspiring. Kate Goldsworthy lectures on sustainable textiles and fashion at Chelsea College of Art in London, one of the only art colleges in Europe to offer a course on sustainability and fashion. She has noticed a "massive" rise in the number of students wanting to apply for the course:


"There is now a much more ingrained ethos about sustainability. People are beginning to react against the speed and profligacy of the fashion cycle". Instead of worrying about quick-change fashion next season, eco-designers are concerned about creating clothing that won't be thrown away, but will be handed down for generations. Take Amy Twigger, of Keep & Share, based in Shropshire, who makes beautiful, hand-made jumpers - only one at a time and to order: Twigger says: "I'm trying to create pieces that people will keep and will rise above trends. They are perennial classics". As fashion historian Jane Mulvagh puts it: "In fact what is happening is that people are beginning to rediscover the make-do and mend ethos of their grandparents - a period when cuffs were turned, stockings were darned and clothes were made to last. If it means paying more, it also means that you take care of these clothes because you respect the craftsmanship that has gone into them".


The ingenuity and imagination of the new generation of designers is dazzling. They have taken recycling out of the thrift shops and converted them into marvels of one-off chic. Edson Raupp, for example, a Brazilian-German designer, based in London, makes bags out of classically tailored English suits that had been consigned to the dustbin or the charity shop. A chalk-striped suit, beautifully tailored of the finest cloth, can make four witty bags. The buttons are then collected, dyed in different colours and sewn onto evening bags in long trailing strands held together by plastic label tags. Finally the suits' labels are cut out and sewn onto other bags in collages. Raupp buys secondhand suits in bulk. He started by purchasing them in charity shops but now finds he needs to go to the organisations that supply the shops to have them delivered in the quantity he now needs.



The Indian Sari is another garment that has undergone a remarkable transformation. Sittal Hari of Sari Couture buys up unwanted or second-hand saris in enormous quantities and has them made into beautiful jackets, skirts and coats. British-born Hari was inspired to start her business when she visited relatives in India bringing with her old saris as presents from her family. She found her relatives didn't want them, and wondering what she could do with these beautiful lengths of fabric she came up with the idea of Sari Couture. All the garments (which start at £200) are made in a factory in London as Hari wants to keep the production local. "We are totally dedicated to recycling" she says, "and we see it as part of our company ethos to go out and talk to schools and give workshops on how to reuse and re-make beautiful things". Hittal set up Sari Couture with a grant of £5000 from London Re-made, an initiative to help recycling projects established by the Mayor of London's office (http://www.londonremade.com/). It has a brief to support what the Office calls "enviro-entrepeneurs", small and medium-sized businesses with a recycling and environmental policy - and it has a fund of £1.8 million from the London Development Agency behind it.


Among the other ethical businesses it has sponsored is Beyond Skin, a vegetarian shoe label.
Lancelot Clark, of the Clark Shoes dynasty, and his son Galahad, have continued the Quaker ideals of their shoemaking forebears with the Worn Again range of their shoe company Terra Plana. Their anti-apathy trainers are made from materials such as old tyres, used coffee-bags, army surplus jackets and scrap car-seat leather. And they look really pretty good. At a different end of the market, in France, Michele and Olivier Chatenet make divine clothing from second-hand haute couture pieces - an Yves St Laurent evening dress remodelled into a two-piece suit perhaps or a silk skirt. In Finland, for the sportier, lumberjacking kind of fashionisti, Globe Hope make heavy-duty utilitarian pieces out of old hospital textiles and army uniforms.


Eco-fashion is not just the concern of a few idealists content to pay over the odds for an unbleached baby-gro. With shoppers more informed now about the real story behind a new T-shirt or a pair of jeans or trainers, it makes good business sense to look for ethical ways to make and market fashion products. Caring, saving, recycling - it's beginning to hit the catwalk. And you don't have to be a vegetarian to get in on the act either. The designers behind Romp, makers of the most luxurious fur, leather and suede coats (all of them the product of happy, free-range, organically-fed animals identified by name and destined for food anyway) puts it like this: "If you don't care at all you are probably quite sad and lonely and I hope that you get some love and learn to smile again soon".


Yes, I know, some of those virtuous "mission statements" can be annoying: but don't let them put you off, this is booming business and makes good sense for everyone from designer to maker to wearer.


The Craft Council's Touring exhibition 'Well Fashioned: Eco Style in the UK' can be seen here:
· The City Gallery, Leicester: 15 July to 26 Aug 2006
· The Design Centre, Barnsley: 7 Sep to 20 Oct 2006
· City Museum & Records Office, Portsmouth: 4 Nov 2006 to 7 Jan 2007
· Bilston Craft Gallery, Wolverhampton: 20 Jan to 3 March 2007

© Lucy Lethbridge. All views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to the European Commission.


The European Commission Representation in the United Kingdom maintains this website to enhance public access to information about its initiatives and European Union policies in general. Our goal is to keep this information timely and accurate. If errors are brought to our attention, we will try to correct them. However the Commission accepts no responsibility or liability whatsoever with regard to the information on this site.
http://www.europe.org.uk/disclaimer


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THE EU ECO-LABEL IS CENTRAL TO EUROPE'S CAMPAIGN TO PROMOTE ENLIGHTENED ENVIRONMENTALISM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. CONSEQUENTLY, ECO-LABELS ARE A CREATURE OF EU GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION.



The EU Ecolabel (The Flower) is the EU's own high-level award scheme for products which meet very high environmental standards. Businesses which can show that their product meets the demanding criteria set by the scheme can apply to the body running the scheme in their member state (the Competent Body) to use the Ecolabel's Flower logo on the product and in advertising.


The scheme currently covers twenty-four product groups, including tourist accommodation and campsites, and the logo appears on thousands of products across Europe. The Ecolabel was originally established by an EU Regulation in 1992, which was revised in 2000. The Commission, which coordinates the running of the scheme, is currently reviewing and revising it again. The public consultation, which was carried out through an online questionnaire, was the second part of a process which began with an evaluation study in 2005.


The evaluation study concluded that the original ideas behind the voluntary scheme were still valid and desirable from a business perspective: The EU Ecolabel provides EU consumers with an environmental certification they can trust, unlike certain other labels which are 'selfclaims'. Additionally it can give businesses the opportunity to use one label for all their pan- European or global marketing.

In summary the study showed that:

• The Ecolabel has contributed to setting targets for better environmental product
performance;

• It has influenced the demand for suppliers to meet high environmental standards;

• Companies participating in the EU scheme use the Ecolabel in their marketing
campaigns;

• Neither users nor non-users of the Ecolabel want to see the label abolished;

• The concept of the EU Ecolabel is preferred to that of national labels.


However:

• There is still low awareness and uneven geographic take-up of the label;

• There are insufficient product group categories;

It suffers from cumbersome procedures and organisational structures - i.e. bureaucracy which limit the Scheme's ability to grow and respond to opportunities;

Fees and cost of getting the label are perceived as barriers;

• There is a lack of perceived public purchasing benefits
.


See Report on the Public Consultation Revision of the EU Ecolabel Regulation (EC) No 1980/2000, European Commission (Oct. 2007) at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/pdf/revision/revision_report2007.pdf .


THE 2007 REPORT FOLLOWED FROM A PRIOR 2005 STUDY PREPARED BY CONSULTANTS ON BEHALF OF THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL ENVIRONMENT, OF THE EU COMMISSION. THE PRIOR STUDY REFLECTS HOW EUROPEAN INDUSTRY LOBBIED FOR EU GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT TO ENSURE A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE THROUGH USE OF EU REGIONAL 'ECO-LABEL' & ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
STANDARDS (EMAS). THIS WAS THOUGHT POSSIBLE BY EMBEDDING ECO-LABEL CERTIFICATION, VERIFICATION & PERFORMANCE STANDARDS/REQUIREMENTS WITHIN EU REGULATIONS AND BY INCORPORATING THEM INTO GOVERNMENT PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REQUIREMENTS


B7. Desired incentives and measures for the EU Eco-label revision:

• Information and promotion campaigns and other actions aimed at increasing the knowledge and the demand of the EU Eco-label are perceived as the most effective measures for supporting the scheme and endorsing its success as a marketing opportunity.

External incentives are also widely requested. Fiscal incentives, such as tax abatement, are thought to be effective, insofar as they enable producers to lower the costs and prices of Eco-labelled products. Another of the ‘most wanted’ incentives is the inclusion of the EU Eco-label as a facilitating condition for public procurement.

Other desirable measures directly relate to various modifications that can be introduced in the Regulation or in its institutional and applicative framework, such as a higher number of product groups or a further extension of the EU Eco-label to services.

• Outsourcing the EU Eco-label to an entirely private body obtains a low degree of support (but also the idea of making it entirely Commission-managed also raises many objections).

• Lowering the number and/or the stringency of the criteria to make the scheme ‘easier’ is not strongly supported (although on the whole the idea is favoured by the literature).

• Finally, it should be emphasised that the proposal of having a graded label, strongly debated in recent years, has been definitively rejected.


C1. Evidence and desired incentives:

• To some extent, the product dimension is already part of EMAS: the environmental management system influences product performance in other phases of the life-cycle and/or in the supply chain.

• There is a certain awareness of the potential benefits emerging from a stronger link and synergy between EMAS and the EU Eco-label.

• “Synergy” between the two voluntary schemes does not mean merging them, but exploiting all the possible opportunities for mutual reinforcement.

• ISO type III labels can be a synergetic tool for both schemes: many opportunities were identified (both in the desk and in the in-field research) for pursuing integration with ISO type III labels, with reference to operational, marketing and institutional synergies.

A major issue for the revision of both the schemes is integrating and linking them with existing legislation and environmental policies (to a wider extent).

In particular, a considerable consensus was found during the desk and in-field research on the strong need for integrating and embedding EMAS and the EU Eco-label in other product-related policy and private-certification instruments (other labels and forms of certifications, other IPP tools, etc.).

A more general request is also being made by stakeholders and organisations taking part in the two schemes for a truly effective and consistent embedding of EMAS and the EU Eco-label in existing and forthcoming legislation, in policy implementation and even in the enforcement of environmental legislation (e.g. regulatory relief and flexibility). Some of the most frequently suggested policy areas for promoting synergy are, for EMAS: the IPPC directive, the Emission trading directive, the Seveso Bis Directive; for the EU Eco-label: EuP, RoHS and, to a minor extent, REACH.


The prior findings was set forth in a 2005 study prepared a group of consultants for the Directorate General Environment, of the EU Commission.


See “EVER: Evaluation of EMAS and Eco-label for their Revision”, Executive Summary (12/26/05) at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/pdf/revision/executive_summary.pdf .

The full study is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/pdf/revision/final_recommendations.pdfvironment/ecolabel/pdf/revision/final_recommendations.pdf .


See also Using Eco-Labels to Promote Producer & Consumer Behavior Modification May Very Well Give Rise to Disguised Trade Barriers, Admits UN
http://itssdinternationalstandards.blogspot.com/2008/03/using-eco-labels-to-promote-producer.html


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[THE EU HAS ALSO INTERVENED IN THE MARKETPLACE TO ESTABLISH AND MONITOR ECO-FRIENDLY FURNITURE PRODUCTION & PROCESSING, AS REFLECTED WITHIN ENVIRONMENTALLY FRIENDLY FURNITURE ECO-LABELING SCHEMES, AS PART OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT (SFM) POLICY FRAMEWORK


The EU had shown interest in tying ecolabelling and furniture product branding together with regional sustainable forest management policy as early as 2001.


A 2001 report prepared for the European Commission recommended that SFM certification be included as an indispensable criterion for award of such a label, through official EU involvement, if necessary. ‘[I]f [private] demand does not exist, it can be created through awareness activities or through procurement requirements in the case of public procurements’ (emphasis added).


See Jurgen Barsch, E. Deliege and P.W.J. Luiten, The Feasibility of an EU Eco-Label for Furniture (FRG Umweltbundesamt (Federal Environmental Agency, February 2001), at pp. 31, 35, available at www.ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/pdf/furniture/feas_study.pdf .


See also Discerning the Forest From the Trees: How Governments Use Ostensibly Private and Voluntary Standards to Avoid WTO Culpability
http://itssdinternationalstandards.blogspot.com/2008/01/discerning-forest-from-trees-how.html


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[ONE IMPORTANT QUESTION READERS SHOULD ASK THEMSELVES, GIVEN THE EMOTIONAL AND OBSSESSIVE CAMPAIGN WAGED BY EUROPEAN AND NOW CERTAIN AMERICAN (DEMOCRATIC PARTY) POLITICIANS (INCLUDING FORMER V.P. AL GORE, SENATORS CLINTON & OBAMA, AND THE 110TH CONGRESSIONAL MAJORITY, IS HOW CLOSELY DOES ENVIRONMENTALISM RESEMBLE CLASSICAL FACISM??? TO THIS END, READERS MAY FIND INFORMATIVE THE FOLLOWING WEBSITES. See, e.g. http://www.ecofascism.com/index.html .


READERS SHOULD AT LEAST CONSIDER THE FINDINGS OF THE FOLLOWING BOOK:

Ecofascism: Lessons from the German Experience

By Janet Biehl and Peter Staudenmaier© Copyright: 1995

Janet Biehl and Peter StaudenmaierLibrary of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication DataBiehl, Janet, 1953-- Ecofascism: lessons from the German experience / by Janet Biehl and Peter Staudenmaier p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 1-873176 73 2 (paper) 1. Green movement--Germany--History--20th century. 2. Fascism-- Germany. 3. Environmental policy--Germany. 4. Environmentalism. 5. Political policy--Germany--History. 6. Right and left (Political science) 7. GrĂ¼nen (Political party) I. Staudenmaier, Peter, 1965-- . II. Title HC79.E5B5 1995 304.2'0943'--dc20 95-40752
CIP British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library.First published in 1995 by AK Press AK Press 22 Lutton Place P.O. Box 40682 Edinburgh, Scotland San Francisco, CA EH8 9PE 94140-0682

http://www.spunk.org/texts/places/germany/sp001630/janet.html

Thursday, February 28, 2008

East Africans Fail to Remove Technical Market Access Barriers Amongst Themselves, Despite Adverse Impact on Trade Flows

East Africa: Remove Trade Barriers


http://allafrica.com/stories/200802120616.html


The Citizen (Dar es Salaam)


EDITORIAL


11 February 2008


Posted to the web 12 February 2008


A workshop was told In Dar es Salaam recently that no member of the East African Community (EAC) has removed non-tariff barriers. This is despite approval of the EAC Council of Ministers that partner states form committees to oversee the issue.


Formation of the national committees was an attempt to address the problem of non-tariff barriers on trade which would now be removed in order to make the movement of goods between member states smooth.


We are a bit perplexed why partner states have not taken steps to implement such an important issue which affects the trade pattern of member states.


For, as it is now, there are many impediments towards smooth trade among them. These hinder the movement of goods from one country to another, contrary to the very purpose of forming the EAC.


Leading forms of barriers include police road blocks, standards requirements, customs procedures, documentation and poor application of the rules of origin.


It is disheartening that while other economic blocks take steps towards closer cooperation the EAC seems to be marking time. And with the turmoil in Kenya it is anybody's guess if member states will ever take steps to implement the resolution of the EAC council of ministers. Let's wait and see.

WTO Finds That China Employed Illegal Protectionist Border Tariffs & Indirect 'Local-Working' Subsidies

WTO rules against China on car parts; Finds in favour of Canada, U.S. and EU


http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20080214.RCHINA14/TPStory/Business


theglobeandmail.com


STEVEN CHASE


With files from AP


February 14, 2008


OTTAWA -- The World Trade Organization has for the first time ruled against China for breaking global trade law in a precedent-setting case over car part imports that is expected to spur further challenges aimed at forcing Beijing to open its markets.


Yesterday's interim decision by the WTO found in favour of Canada, the United States and the European Union, all of which complained that China is raising unfair barriers to imports of foreign car parts.


China only joined the 151-member WTO in 2001 and while the state-heavy economy faces several challenges to its trade behaviour at the global body, yesterday's ruling is the first decision handed down.


International Trade Minister David Emerson cheered the ruling - which is officially secret until March despite being leaked yesterday - saying the decision may help open up a new market for
Canadian auto parts makers.


Print Edition - Section Front


"Hopefully it will bring about change in the practices that China's been applying," he said. "With our companies in such tough shape right now, a growing market is critically important to restoring health to our Canadian auto parts industry."


The WTO ruling is only an interim decision but the global referee's adjudicators have never changed their minds in the final version of their rulings. It could take more than a year for the case to conclude, but when it does, China may be forced to alter its behaviour or face trade sanctions from Ottawa, Washington and Brussels.


The WTO reportedly found that China was breaking agreed-upon global trade rules by taxing imports of car parts at the same higher rate levied on foreign-assembled autos.


"It's rendering it uneconomic for Canadian parts suppliers in this market," Mr. Emerson said of China's tax rate.


Toronto trade lawyer Lawrence Herman with Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP predicts more WTO challenges of Chinese trade barriers.


Mr. Herman noted China's growing importance as an export destination, particularly for U.S. goods. "I think it's the beginning of many more such cases where the U.S. is taking on China, rightly or wrongly, for not complying with WTO rules," he said. "The huge U.S. trade deficit with China can't be ignored."


U.S. exports to China have more than quadrupled between 1996 and 2006, when they hit $55.2-billion (U.S.). That same year, the U.S. trade deficit with China hit $233-billion.


The three trade powers argued at the WTO that China's tariff was discouraging auto makers from using imported car parts for the vehicles they assemble in China. As a result, car parts firms had an incentive to shift production to China, costing Americans, Canadians and Europeans their jobs, they said.


The ruling will be closely watched by makers of batteries and brakes, seats and spark plugs on both sides of the Atlantic, including U.S.-based Delphi Corp. (General Motors' former parts supplier) and Robert Bosch GmbH in Germany.


China, which can appeal the ruling, claims the tariffs are intended to stop whole cars being imported in large chunks, allowing companies to avoid the higher tariff rates for finished cars. It argues all measures are consistent with WTO rules and do not discriminate against foreign auto parts.


But the U.S. and EU say China promised not to treat parts as whole cars when it joined the WTO in 2001.


[This point is significant in light of the prior 1998 WTO case Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (WT/DS54,55,59 & 64/R). US and EU allege that two sets of Indonesia measures constitute subsidies that cause ‘serious prejudice’ to their interests within the meaning of SCM Art. 5 (c). They alleged that the effect of the ‘subsidies’ was to displace or impede imports of ‘like’ products from the EC and US into the subsidizing Indonesian market. In other words, the prices of 'like' EC and US autos were significantly undercut by the subsidized national car company, and thus discriminated against in the marketplace.


The first set of measures entailed a ‘grant’ of National Car company status to Indonesian car companies that met specified criteria as to ownership of facilities, use of trademarks and technology. The ‘benefits’ provided were exemption from luxury tax on car National Car sales and exemption from import duties. They were maintainable by meeting increasing local content requirements.


The second set of measures provided that National Cars manufactured in a foreign country by Indonesian nationals and that fulfill (20%) local content requirements shall be treated the same as ‘National Cars’ (exemption from luxury tax and import duties). The 20% local content requirement was deemed satisfied if the overseas car manufacturer ‘counter-purchases’ Indonesian parts and components that account for 25% or more of the cost & freight (C&F) value of the imported cars. Indonesia maintained a duty of 200 percent on imports of finished passenger cars. As a result, almost ALL passenger cars imported into Indonesia including the EC and US models in question were imported as ‘completely knocked down’ (CKD) kits and assembled in Indonesia.


The WTO Appellate Body (AB) did not consider that an unassembled product ipso facto was NOT a ‘like’ product to that product assembled. The AB considered that a tariff classification was a useful tool in ‘like’ product analysis. It noted how the Gen’l Rules for Interpreting Harmonized System stated that any reference in a heading to an article shall include a reference to that article incomplete or unfinished, provided, the incomplete or unfinished article has the essential character of the complete or finished article.


The AB believed that a comparable approach to the relation between assembled and unassembled products made good sense in the context of that dispute. Due to the high Indonesian duties, ‘completely built-up, EC and US producers shipped ‘cars in a box’ to Indonesia. Consequently, they could properly be considered to have characteristics closely resembling those of a completed car. In WTO jurisprudence, the AB employed a ‘Big Accordion’ of ‘likeness’.]


"It will be instructive to see how China responds," U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab said in a recent interview with Associated Press. "If, as we hope and expect, China will be found in contravention of its WTO obligations, hopefully that will help those forces within China that have been advocating reform."

Wednesday, February 6, 2008

Trading Places - The New Mercantilism

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_79/ai_n13502257/print


Trading places


Peter F. Drucker


The National Interest


Spring, 2005


THE NEW world economy is fundamentally different from that of the fifty years following World War II. The United States may well remain the political and military leader for decades to come. It is likely also to remain the world's richest and most productive national economy for a long time (though the European Union as a whole is both larger and more productive). But the U.S. economy is no longer the single dominant economy.


The emerging world economy is a pluralist one, with a substantial number of economic "blocs." Eventually there may be six or seven blocs, of which the U.S.-dominated NAFTA is likely to be only one, coexisting and competing with the European Union (EU), MERCOSUR in Latin America, ASEAN in the Far East, and nation-states that are blocs by themselves, China and India. These blocs are neither "free trade" nor "protectionist", but both at the same time.


Even more novel is that what is emerging is not one but four world economies: a world economy of information; of money; of multinationals (one no longer dominated by American enterprises); and a mercantilist world economy of goods, services and trade. These world economies overlap and interact with one another. But each is distinct with different members, a different scope, different values and different institutions. Let us examine each in turn.


The World Economy of Information


INFORMATION AS a concept and a distinct category is an invention of the 18th century--of the newspaper in England and the encyclopedia in France. Within a century, information became global with the development of the modern postal system in the 1830s, followed almost immediately by the electric telegraph and the first computer language, the Morse Code. But unlike the newspaper and the encyclopedia, neither the postal service nor the telegraph made information public. On the contrary, they made it "privileged communication." "Public information" by contrast--newspapers, radio, television--ran one way only, from the publisher to the recipient. The editor rather than the reader decided what was "fit to print."


The Internet, in sharp contrast, makes information both universal and multidirectional rather than keeping it private or one-way. Everyone with a telephone and a personal computer has direct access to every, other human being with a phone and a PC. It gives everyone practically limitless access to information. And it gives everyone the ability to create information at minimal cost, that is, to create his own website and become a "publisher."


In the long run, the most important implication is probably the impact of information on mentality and awareness. It creates new affinities and new communities. The woman student in Shanghai who taps into the Internet remains Chinese, but she sees herself at the same time as a member of a worldwide, non-national "information society."


Businesses and professional groups such as lawyers and doctors have, of course, had access all along to worldwide information in their own field. But the Internet gives such access to the ultimate customer. In the United States at least (but apparently also in Japan and Europe), the ultimate customer now gets his information about plane schedules and airfares from the Internet rather than from a traditional travel agent. And while a good many book buyers in the United States still pick up and pay for the book of their choice at a bookstore in their neighborhood, an increasing number of them decide what books to buy by reading about them online first. An automobile still has to be serviced by a local dealer. But increasingly, buyers first study both their choice for the new car and their options for trading in their old car online before visiting a dealer.


What is already discernible is that, like all new distribution channels, this new information economy will change not only how customers buy, but what they buy. It will change customers' values and expectations, and with them how to promote goods and services, how to market and sell them, and how to service them online. In other words, Internet customers are becoming a new and distinct market. In the early years of the 21st century, power is shifting to the ultimate consumer.


There is no distance in this world economy. Everything is "local." The potential customers searching for a product do not know--and do not care--where the products come from. This does not eliminate or even curtail protectionism. But it changes it. Tariffs can still determine where a product or service has to be bought. But they are increasingly unable to protect the domestic producers' price.


One example: To get the industrial Midwest with its 140,000 steel workers to vote Republican in congressional elections, President Bush slapped a prohibitive tariff on imports of steel from Europe and Japan in 2001. He got what he wanted: a (bare) Republican majority in the Congress. But while the large steel users (such as automobile makers, railroads and building contractors) were forced by the tariff to buy domestic, they immediately set about cutting their use of steel so as not to spend more on it than they would have had to spend had they been able to buy the imports. Bush's tariff action thus only accelerated the long-term decline of the traditional midwestern steel producers and the jobs they generate. Tariffs, in other words, can still force users to buy domestic, but they are no longer capable of protecting the domestic producers' prices. Those are set through information and on the world-market level.


This development underlies the steady shift in protectionism: from tariffs--the traditional way--to protection through rules, regulations and especially export subsidies. World trade has grown spectacularly in the last fifty years. The largest growth has been in subsidized farm exports from the developed world: western and central Europe, Australia, Canada and the United States. Farm subsidies are now the only net income of French farmers, as their crops produce nothing but net losses and are grown only as the entitlement for the subsidies. These subsidies are in fact a major--perhaps the major--cement of the Franco-German alliance, and with it, of the European Union.


The international organization designed to set world economic policy is the World Trade Organization (WTO). But its meetings and agreements deal less and less with trade and tariffs, and instead with rules, regulations and subsidies. The discipline of international economics still, in large measure, concerns itself with international trade--that is, with the flow of money, goods and services. But the essence of the new world economy is that it is, above all, an economy of information and truly a global economy.


The Global Oligopoly of Money


THE NEXT major economic crisis will most probably be a crisis of the U.S. dollar in the world economy. It will put to a severe test the oligopoly of the central banks of the developed countries that now rules over the world financial economy.


Sixty years ago, in the Bretton Woods meetings of 1944, which tried to refashion a world economy that had been devastated by depression and war, John Maynard Keynes, the 20th century's greatest economist, proposed a supra-national central bank. It was vetoed by the United States. The two institutions that Bretton Woods established instead, the Bank for International Development (World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are, despite their impressive names, auxiliary rather than central--the former mainly financing development projects, the latter providing financial first aid to governments in distress.


The Bretton Woods system was never the stable, "non-political" system Keynes wanted. It could not and did not prevent currencies from being overvalued or undervalued. Still, although it limped from one crisis to the next, the Bretton Woods system worked for most of the half-century after World War II. And there was only one reason why it worked (however poorly): the commitment to it of the United States and the strength of the U.S. dollar as the world's key currency.


The dollar is still the world's key currency. But the Bretton Woods system is being killed by the U.S. government deficit, which is fast becoming the sinkhole of the world financial economy. The persistent U.S. deficit creates a persistent deficit in the U.S. balance of payments, which make both the U.S. economy and the government increasingly dependent on massive injections of short-term and panic-prone money from abroad. The U.S. savings rate is barely high enough to finance the minimum capital needs of industry. It could, in all likelihood, be raised considerably by raising interest rates. But that is not only politically almost impossible; it would also require that a larger share of incomes go into savings rather than into consumption, with an inevitable collapse of an economy based on consumer spending and low interest rates, as for instance, the U.S. housing market.


The government deficit is therefore being financed almost in its entirety by foreign investments in the United States, mostly in government securities like short-term treasury notes and medium-term bonds. The Japanese are converting most, if not all, of their trade surplus with the United States into dollar-denominated U.S. government securities and have thus become the largest U.S. creditor.


It is often argued, especially in Washington, that the deficit is mostly an accounting mirage. Defense spending--the main cause of the deficit--enables other free countries to keep their own defense spending low, which then generates the surpluses these countries invest in U.S. government securities. But this is a political argument. The economic fact is that the United States increasingly borrows short term (U.S. securities can be sold overnight) to invest long term and with very limited liquidity. This, needless to say, is an unstable and volatile system. It would collapse if the foreign holders of U.S. government securities (above all, the Japanese) were for whatever reason (such as a crash in their own economy) to dump their holdings of U.S. government securities. It certainly cannot be extended indefinitely, which, among other serious drawbacks, calls into question the long-term viability of the Bush Doctrine's goal of defending and extending the "zone of freedom" around the world.


The World Economy of the Multinationals


THERE WERE 7,258 multinational companies worldwide in 1969. Thirty-one years later, in 2000, the number had increased ninefold to more than 63,000. By that year, multinationals accounted for 80 percent of the world's industrial production.


But what is a multinational? Most Americans would answer: a big American manufacturer with foreign subsidiaries. That is wrong in almost every particular.


American-based multinationals are only a fraction--and a diminishing one--of all multinationals. Only 185 of the world's 500 largest multinationals--fewer than 40 percent--are headquartered in the United States (the European Union has 126, Japan 108). And multinationals are growing much faster outside the United States, especially in Japan, Mexico, and lately, Brazil.


Furthermore, most multinationals are not big. Rather, they are mostly small- to medium-sized enterprises. Typical perhaps is a German manufacturer of specialized surgical instruments who, with $20 million in sales and with plants in eleven countries, has around 60 percent of the world market in the field. And only a fraction of multinationals are manufacturers. Banks are probably the largest single group of multinationals, followed by insurance companies such as Germany's Allianz, financial-services institutions such as GE Finance Corporation and Merrill Lynch, wholesale distributors (especially in pharmaceuticals), and retailers like Japan's Ito Yokado.


The traditional multinational was indeed a domestic company with foreign subsidiaries, like Coca-Cola. But the new multinationals are increasingly being managed as one integrated business regardless of national boundaries, and the managers of the "foreign subsidiaries" are seen and treated as just another group of "division managers" rather than as top managements of semi-autonomous businesses. Internally, new multinationals are often not even organized by geography, but worldwide by products or services, such as one worldwide division for cleaning products or short-term inventory loans. They are increasingly organized by "markets": fully-developed markets (such as western and northern Europe or Japan); "developing markets" (eastern Europe, Latin America and parts of East Asia); and the "underdeveloped markets" and big "blocs" (China, Russia and India)--each with different objectives and strategies.


Finally, the new multinationals are increasingly not domestic companies with foreign subsidiaries, but are more likely to be domestic companies with foreign partners. They are being built through alliances, know-how agreements, marketing agreements, joint research, joint management development programs and so on. They require very different management skills; they must persuade, not command. The typical old multinational began planning with the questions: "What do we want to achieve? What are our objectives?" The first question in the new multinational is likely to be: "What do our partners value? What do they want to achieve? What are their competencies?" And in turn: "What do they need to know about our values, our goals, our competencies?"


We have almost no data on the world economy of the multinationals. Our statistics are primarily domestic. Nor do we truly understand the multinational and how it is being managed. How, for instance, does a multinational pharmaceutical company decide in what country first to introduce a new drug? How does a medium-sized multinational, like the German surgical-instrument maker mentioned earlier, decide whether to keep importing into the United States? To buy a small American competitor who has become available? To build its own plant in the United States and to start manufacturing there?


Our dominant economic theories--both Keynes and Friedman's monetarism--assume that any but the smallest national economy can be managed in isolation from world economy and world society. With an estimated 30 percent of the U.S. workforce affected by foreign trade (and a much higher percentage in most European countries), this is patently absurd. But an economic theory of the world economy exists so far only in fragments. It is badly needed. In the meantime, however, the world economy of multinationals has become a truly global one, rather than one dominated by America and by U.S. companies.


The New Mercantilism


THE MODERN state was invented by the French political philosopher Jean Bodin in his 1576 book Six Livres de la Republique. He invented the state for one purpose only: to generate the cash needed to pay the soldiers defending France against a Spanish army financed by silver from the New World--the first standing army since the Romans' more than a thousand years earlier. Mercenaries have to be paid in cash, and the only way to obtain a large and reliable cash income over any period--at a time when domestic economies had not yet been fully monetized and could therefore not yield a permanent tax--was a revenue obtained through keeping imports low while pushing exports and subsidizing them.


It took 300 years--the time until the unification of Germany and Italy in the 19th century--before Bodin's political invention, the nation-state, came to dominate Europe. But his mercantilism was adopted almost immediately by every European government, large or small. It remained the reigning philosophy until Adam Smith showed the absurdity of believing (as mercantilism does) that a nation can get rich by robbing its neighbors.


Twenty-five years after Smith, mercantilism was still the doctrine that underlay America's first and most important work in political theory, The Report on Manufacturers (1791) by Alexander Hamilton. And almost a century later, in the second half of the 19th century, Bismarck based the new German Empire on Bodin's mercantilism as adapted to Europe by Hamilton's great German admirer, Friedrich List, in his 1841 book, The National System of Political Economy. However discredited as economic theory, mercantilism, not Adam Smith's free trade, thus became the policy and practice of governments virtually everywhere (except for one century in the UK).


But mercantilism is increasingly becoming the policy of "blocs" rather than of individual nation-states. These blocs--with the European Union the most structured one, and the U.S.-dominated NAFTA trying to embrace the entire Western Hemisphere (or at least North and Central America)--are becoming the integrating units of the new world economy. Each bloc is trying to establish free trade internally and to abolish within the bloc all hurdles, restrictions and impediments, first to the movement of goods and money and ultimately to the movement of people. The United States, for instance, has proposed extending NAFTA to embrace all of Central America.


At the same time, each bloc is becoming more protectionist against the outside. The most extreme protectionism, as already discussed, consists of rules with respect to agriculture and the protection of farm incomes. But similar protectionism is certain to develop for blue-collar workers in the manufacturing industry, and for the same reason: They are becoming an endangered species, the victims of productivity.


In the United States for instance, manufacturing production increased in volume by at least 30 percent during the 1990s. It has at least doubled since 1960, and may even have tripled. (We have only money figures and have to guess at volume.) But manual workers in industrial production in the same period decreased from some 35 percent of the work force to barely more than 13 percent--and their numbers are still going down. Total employment in the manufacturing industry has remained the same proportion of the work force--it probably has even gone up. But the growth has been in white-collar work rather than the manual kind.


A mercantilist world economy, however, faces the same problems that led to the ultimate collapse of mercantilist national policies: It is impossible to export unless someone imports. This means, as Adam Smith showed 250 years ago, that the blocs must concentrate on those areas in which they have comparative advantages. In today's technology and world economy, that means concentrating on an area of knowledge work. Such concentration is already beginning. India is emerging as a world leader in applied-knowledge work--its comparative advantage is the 150 million well-educated Indians whose main language is English. China may similarly attain leadership through its world-class competence in manufacturing management--the legacy of the communist emphasis on output and production.


And just as it was for the mercantilists of 17th- and 18th-century Europe, an adequate home market (or access to one, as the Swiss and Dutch had to the markets of Germany and central Europe in the 19th century) is the most effective base for being competitive in the world economy. This "home market"--small enough to be protected and big enough to be competitive--is what the "blocs" provide.


Thus, the European Union is already in the process of creating the institutions for its bloc to be effective in this world economy: a European Parliament, a European Central Bank, a European Cartel Office and so on. Even the French, reluctantly, are integrating their economy and their industries--and even their agriculture--into the economy, the industries and the agriculture of the EU (provided that the Germans foot the bill).


The United States, of course, has been a genuine bloc and a nation-state all along. Its economic institutions have been federal, at least since the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Reserve Banking System. U.S. institutions like the Federal Reserve Bank of New York also act, in emergencies (such as the recent collapse of the Mexican peso) as the agent of NAFTA.


WHAT, THEN, is likely to be the future relationship between these two blocs? The United States has openly announced its policy of extending NAFTA to all of Latin America. And while NAFTA means free trade within the bloc, it also means high protection externally, and especially high protection against Europe. Officially, the United States is still committed to worldwide free trade. But the actual result of its policies is that a zone of preferential trade agreements is gradually emerging around the United States--not unlike the bloc that is the EU. The world economy is thus fast coming to look far more like the mercantilism of Alexander Hamilton than like Adam Smith's free trade. It is fast becoming an "interzonal" rather than an "international" world economy.


But a new kind of mercantilist rivalry is emerging in this new economy--one in which the United States suffers from little-noticed disadvantages. For instance, the EU is seeking to export its regulations (and to impose its high regulatory costs on the United States) through international agreements, the reinterpretation of WTO rules, and the growing acceptance of EU standards in third markets. (1) It is also promoting its new currency, the euro, as a rival and alternative to the dollar as the world's reserve currency--a step that, if it succeeded, would greatly reduce the U.S. government's ability to attract foreign funds to finance its deficit and thus maintain the Bush Doctrine. Nor can the United States be certain of maintaining the solidarity of its own bloc in competition with the EU.


Several Latin American states are going slow" on the negotiations to extend NAFTA for political reasons. The EU is itself seeking closer trade and economic relationships with Latin America through partnership talks with MERCOSUR. And the recent trend of Latin American politics has been to drift away from "neo-liberalism" and towards a Left perennially tempted by anti-yanqui protectionism. What is different today is that the EU offers these political forces the ability to choose free trade while simultaneously resisting U.S. "hegemony." The United States could therefore find itself with a smaller "home market" than rival blocs, but with the same high-cost regulations, in a world of intense mercantilist competition.


For thirty years after World War II, the U.S. economy dominated practically without serious competition. For another twenty years it was clearly the world's foremost economy and especially the undisputed leader in technology and innovation. Though the United States today still dominates the world economy of information, it is only one major player in the three other world economies of money, multinationals and trade. And it is facing rivals that, either singly or in combination, could conceivably make America Number Two.


(1) For more, see Lawrence Kogan, "Exporting Europe's Protectionism", The National Interest (Fall 2004).


Peter F. Drucker is a writer, consultant and teacher. His most recent book is Managing the Next Society (2002).

COPYRIGHT 2005 The National Interest, Inc.